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Abstract: Moral debate over vegetarianism forms the backdrop to a preliminary 
consideration of the questions:  Is it ethical to produce, sell and eat faux meat? Is 
it ethical to produce, sell and wear fake animal skin? Is it ethical to sell or wear 
secondhand or thriftshop genuine animal skin? If vegetarianism is morally 
required, the question of just what uses of nonhuman animals are ethical or 
unethical and on what grounds is always on tap. In this piece, I examine the 
above questions in light of deontological then utilitarian reasons for 
vegetarianism. I conclude deontological or animal rights grounds entail the moral 
condemnation of faux meat and fake and secondhand animal skin. I conclude 
utilitarian or animal welfare grounds entail, with some qualification, the moral 
acceptability of faux meat and fake animal skin but the clear moral 
unacceptability of secondhand animal skin.   
 
"'Without courts of law, men would devour each other.'" 
-quoted by Pufendorf in On the Duty of Man and Citizen, Book II Chapter 5 
Introduction 
Vegetarianism is the practice of refusing all mammal and fish flesh in one's diet. 
Some vegetarians go further, becoming vegan, by refusing to eat all animal 
products, including all dairy products and all products of animals.  A friend of one 
of my daughters, a particularly strict vegan, does not eat honey. Besides 
observing these food restrictions, many, perhaps most, vegetarians deny 
themselves garments, footwear, accessories, etc., whose production requires the 
death of an animal. But ethical choices in the apparel area are somewhat less 
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clear than they are in the case of food. Some vegetarians I know think it is okay 
to buy or wear secondhand or vintage leather, for example. 
Returning to the case of food, there seems to be little resistance among 
vegetarians to the practice of producing, selling or eating 'tofu chicken' nuggets, 
'garden beef' burgers or veggie salami slices. "Veat" is the latest faux meat 
product on the market boasting the sort of juiciness meat has but which most 
faux meat products lack. Based on my own experience, the boast is legitimate. 
My vegetarian children and I recently had a very 'traditional' Christmas dinner. 
The faux meat section of even the most discerning organic or health food grocery 
store is becoming a veritable doppelganger for the traditional meat counter.  
It may be premature to assume the moral correctness of vegetarianism.1 
However, in what follows, I am going to assume, but not argue, it is wrong to use 
animals in ways which violate their rights or require they suffer or die when this is 
avoidable. As such, my argument will pose a practical challenge to vegetarians 
though a merely academic one to those who reject vegetarianism as a moral 
position. Assuming then, the moral correctness of vegetarianism, it seems to me 
there arises an interesting and potentially important question regarding the ethics 
of faux meat and second hand animal products. Is there something morally 
wrong with producing, selling or eating faux meat, wearing fake leather or fake 
fur garments or wearing thriftshop leather or fur? For the most part, I will treat the 
otherwise separate activities of producing, selling and using (eating, wearing) 
together.  
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There are numerous types of reasons offered to support vegetarianism. 
Foremost among them are the utilitarian ones Peter Singer gives us in Animal 
Liberation and deontological ones advanced by animal rights theorists such as 
Tom Regan in The Case for Animal Rights. According to Singer, if there are 
nonanimal food and apparel options, one ought to develop and choose them 
based on the fact choosing animal options results, directly or indirectly, in a net 
balance of unnecessary suffering.2 Regan agrees with Singer's conclusion but, 
rejecting his utilitarianism, argues since there are no nonquestion begging 
grounds upon which to deny nonhuman animals the right not to be regarded or 
treated as mere resources, humans have no moral right to kill nonhuman animals 
for food and clothing.3 
In what follows, I begin by analysing the faux meat question using these 
two main types of moral reasoning then follow with an analysis of the fake and 
thriftshop skin question. I conclude both utilitarian and deontological vegetarians 
should condemn the use of vintage or secondhand or thriftshop leather and fur 
apparel. But they will disagree when it comes to faux meat and fake fur, etc.. 
Utilitarian vegetarians should only condemn the production and consumption of 
such products if it turns out their use or ingestion tends to convert more 
vegetarians to or back to meat eating and wearing animal skin than meat eaters 
and animal skin wearers to vegetarianism. Deontological vegetarians, on the 
other hand, should condemn all production, sale and use of faux and fake animal 
products.4 
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Faux Meat? 
At first glance, the answer to the faux meat question seems simple enough. On 
neither of the grounds cited above - not on Singer's utilitarian grounds nor on 
Regan's rights-based grounds - does the production, sale or consumption of faux 
meat appear morally problematic. In the first case, since faux meat contains no 
meat, it counts as a nonanimal alternative to eating animal flesh. Not a single 
animal is killed or otherwise harmed in its production. And since no animal is 
killed or otherwise harmed in its production, one can certainly argue, in the 
second case, no animal's rights are violated in the production, sale or 
consumption of faux meat.  
These arguments need to be subjected to critical scrutiny, however. Let's 
start with the deontological or rights-based defense of faux meat. It appears to 
assume the only relevant right when it comes to faux meat is the right, say, to 
security of the person. Again, assuming the rights-based case for vegetarianism 
is a good one, there are no nonquestion begging grounds for denying nonhuman 
animals personhood status. If a human being's right not to be slaughtered for his 
or her meat is derived from a basic right to security of the person (a plausible 
hypothesis), then, granting the same derived right to nonhuman animals, we may 
not slaughter them for this purpose either. Since faux meat does not involve the 
slaughter of any animal, no animal's right not to be slaughtered based on its right 
to security of the person is violated.  
However, if nonhuman animals have the same basic rights human ones 
do, then all nonhuman animals have a basic right to autonomy and so not to be 
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represented as a mere resource. We will avoid the absurd consequences of the 
more immoderate versions of the animal rights position and take it in its best 
light. No, nonhuman animals do not have to be given access to voting booths. 
Yes, they do have to be left to live out their existences according to their natures 
in a manner consistent with the same consideration human animals give to one 
another.  
It is this right to autonomy, however, that seems to raise a problem for the 
rights-based defense of faux meat consumption. Suppose that next to the faux 
nonhuman animal meat section at your local market was a faux human animal 
meat section. Breaded digits, Thai thighs, etc.. It does not take much business 
sense to realize the marketing error of such a sales gimmick. However, this is 
hardly the point here. A rights-based theorist could argue it is wrong to produce, 
sell or eat faux human animal meat because in and of itself, this threatens the 
autonomy rights of human beings. It does so by representing human beings as 
mere resources and in a manner which cannot be rescued, if any such 
representation can, by appeal to artistic freedom.   
Much the same argument could be made against Internet pedophiles who 
construct pornographic images of children from photographs taken then 
manipulated from online clothing catalogues or other perfectly innocent pictures 
of children floating around in the public domain. These pedophiles could argue, 
granting adequate precautions to prevent identification, no actual child is being 
harmed or interfered with in any way in the production and consumption of this 
material. And even if one objected tampering with a child's likeness in this 
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manner harms that child in some way, the pedophile can respond by using 
completely fabricated photographic images. Nevertheless, the argument can be 
made given the logic and nonartistic intent of such material it represents children 
as a mere sexual resource and as such, the material itself can be considered 
immoral.  
So, based on an analogy with the creative Internet pedophile, it seems 
faux meat, from the point of view of rights-based vegetarianism, is morally 
problematic. By producing and selling tofu which has the taste, texture and 
appearance of regular nonhuman animal meat, we are participating in the 
nonartistic representation of nonhuman animals as mere resources. Assuming 
vegetarianism is morally correct on deontological grounds, such acts must be 
morally wrong. Things are somewhat less clear when it comes to eating faux 
meat however. Would it be immoral for a deontological vegetarian who is 
repulsed by the thought of eating meat, to eat faux meat?5 You would have a 
hard time showing such a person is endorsing the representation of animals as a 
mere resource. However, since it would be impossible to eat faux meat unless it 
had been produced, doing so would require something immoral. My 
understanding of deontology tells me this is a logically unacceptable result. If 
eating faux meat is moral then producing it must be moral as well. But on 
deontological grounds, producing faux meat is immoral. Therefore eating it must 
also be immoral on deontological grounds even though the consumer may not be 
endorsing a representation of non-human animals as mere resources. 
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Now what about Singer? From a utilitarian point of view, how does faux 
meat rate? Again, it seems on the surface at least, faux meat fares well under 
Singer. Singer is concerned with whether a practice causes actual suffering. So 
even if faux meat represents animals as mere resources, that does not make it 
wrong to produce, sell or eat faux meat. Nevertheless, as a consequentialist, 
Singer would have to dig a little deeper. What are the possible consequences to 
all those concerned of producing, selling and eating faux meat? 
We need some social science here -- social science which is currently 
unavailable to my knowledge. We need to know if there is a tendency for 
vegetarians who eat faux meat to lapse as a result. Also, we would need to know 
if there is a greater chance a meat eater will consider becoming vegetarian when 
there are faux meat options available. If the overall result is more conversions 
back to meat than to vegetarianism, then faux meat will be morally problematic 
according to a utilitarian like Singer. If there is no difference or more vegetarian 
conversions, then faux meat might be off the utilitarian hook. 
So it looks like if you are a rights based vegetarian, there is no moral room 
for faux meat. Not only should you not eat it, you should morally condemn its 
production, sale and consumption. On the other hand, if you are a utilitarian 
vegetarian, the jury is out until the social science comes in. Nevertheless, if, as a 
utilitarian faux meat eating vegetarian, you find yourself more tempted by real 
meat then, unless you are sure of your ability to resist this urge, you should stop 
eating the faux variety. Also, from a utilitarian point of view, the lack of social 
science on this question should be remedied. If, indeed, the tendency of the 
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proliferation of faux meat products is to increase the likelihood of back to meat 
conversions, the production, sale and consumption of faux meat should be 
rejected as immoral. I suspect, however, the reverse is true and as such, there is 
no utilitarian problem with faux meat. 
 
Fake Fur and Thriftshop Leather? 
The apparel question is like and unlike the food question. Thriftshop leather is not 
fake animal skin, though there is an animal skin question here (I am including 
fake fur in what follows.) Fake leather has been a fashion staple practically since 
the invention of plastics. Research and development has brought it closer and 
closer to the 'real thing.' Today, fake leathers are virtually indistinguishable from 
the genuine article in terms of look and feel (fake fur has further to go). What 
differences remain seem mostly in how the two behave over time. Genuine 
leather becomes softer and changes its colour somewhat as it ages and absorbs 
the wearer's own skin oils. Genuine leather also smells different. These 
differences may be contingent on the state of fake leather technology but I think it 
is safe to assume, so long as no sea change in social attitudes towards using 
animals in this way occurs, there will always be a market for the real thing.  
The thriftshop leather question, on the other hand, is about whether it is 
morally acceptable to wear real albeit old animal skin or other animal products. 
Another of my daughters has argued since the purchase of thriftshop leather, 
unlike the purchase of new leather, does not contribute in any way to the 
slaughter of more nonhuman animals, there is no ethical problem with buying or 
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wearing it. This argument seems to rely on the assumption of a Japanese style 
'just in time' product manufacture and distribution system "where parts and raw 
materials are delivered just before they are needed" together with the assumption 
of a "zero inventory" approach  according to which "buffer stocks represented 
costs that could be eliminated."6 Apparently, The Gap is a 'just in time' outfit 
where information on sales is directed immediately from the till to a computer 
system which re-orders the sold item. Clearly, these items are not delivered one 
by one but the system as a whole is significantly more responsive to the actual 
movement of stock than more traditional buffer stock approaches.  
While there is arguably less waste with a 'just in time' system, there is also 
potential for a greater sense of individual responsibility for the death of an animal 
via the purchase of a new leather garment. Buying vintage or secondhand 
leather, the argument might go, since it is not a trigger in such a system, does 
not have the same consequences. No more animals are killed for their skin when 
you buy secondhand leather garments and as such, doing so is morally 
unproblematic. This argument appears to have some merit. 
Another argument in defense of buying and wearing secondhand leather 
sometimes heard is since the beast is long dead, there's nothing wrong with 
wearing its skin. This second argument is, of course, unpersuasive. Just how 
long the animal in question has been dead seems moot, if only on the grounds 
the actual time any piece of leather, new or old, has been off its host is virtually 
impossible to determine. In any case, even with new garments, the skins 
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themselves are likely to have been off the animal a long time. This argument also 
fails to indicate why the age of the skins is ethically important.  
Following from the deontological argument against eating faux meat, it is 
morally problematic on animal rights based grounds to wear fake leather. And 
assuming vegetarianism is correct on deontological grounds, it is also morally 
wrong to use vintage or secondhand leather. Whether more animals are killed or 
not is irrelevant. Fake leather represents animals as a mere resource. Genuine 
leather, regardless of its age, requires treating an actual animal as a mere 
resource. But is it morally worse to wear real leather, new or secondhand than 
fake? Intuitively, it does seem worse. However deontological reasoning does not 
allow for degrees of immorality. So, counterintuitively, buying and wearing fake 
leather is just as immoral, on deontological grounds, as buying and wearing new 
and secondhand leather. All are equally guilty of regarding animals as mere 
resources and arguably not works of art in the sense required by a principle of 
artistic freedom. Also, producing, selling and eating real meat, on this reasoning, 
is as but not more immoral than producing, selling and eating faux meat.  
The longstanding niche occupied by fake leather (and fake fur) in the 
fashion industry sets the wearable skin question apart from the edible flesh 
question. Perhaps it is just this fact -- that fake skin has been around such a long 
time and is so much a part of our lives -- that tends to make even strict vegans 
and others made uneasy by faux meat, morally indifferent to it. Secondhand 
leather, on the other hand, seems to invite the very same moral worries eating 
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meat and wearing new leather does. How might a utilitarian like Singer respond 
to the fake and secondhand leather question? 
Singer would likely respond to the fake leather question in the same way 
he would respond to the faux meat question. It seems less likely conversions 
from fake leather to or back to real, new leather will occur than conversions back 
to Oscar Meyer as a result of eating tofu hot dogs. I'm not sure why this seems 
the case though it may have something to do with eating habits being harder to 
change than choices about what sort of clothing to wear.7 As for conversions 
from real to fake skin, there seems reason to suppose that, as fake skin 
technology continues to improve, its lower price compared to genuine leather or 
fur might tend to convert 'skinophiles' to the fake product. If these speculations 
are borne out, it follows the production and use of fake skin goods might be 
morally recommended according to Singer's utilitarian argument against the use 
of nonhuman animals for such purposes.  
I'm uneasy, however, with the assumption made in the 'just in time' 
argument that no harm of the sort with which Singer is concerned is done when 
someone wears a vintage or secondhand leather jacket, for instance. What if, 
given a particularly cool old leather jacket, the wearer causes others to want one, 
others who may not realize the jacket is old? Wearing leather, according to this 
concern, is a form of advertising or promoting the wearing of leather regardless 
of the age or provenance of the garment. Since utilitarians are not concerned 
with motives and only indirectly with intentions, the fact the wearer of 
secondhand leather is not motivated by a desire to promote the wearing of 
Between the Species V August 2005 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 12
animal skin and does not intend this result is irrelevant to the morality of doing 
so. If the consequences of doing so include the successful promotion of genuine 
leather garments, then there is going to be an ethical concern here.  Especially 
since there are alternatives available, my guess is Singer would come down 
against the use of secondhand animal skin. These reasons, of course, might also 
work to undermine a utilitarian's defense of fake leather (insofar as it may be 




What might explain the allure of animal products? The marketing of edible flesh 
and wearable animal skin seems to rely on a desire to sensuously revel in the 
carcass of a fresh kill. Here is a stunning excerpt from A. F. Byatt's Babel Tower 
in illustration: 
Frederica feels a perverse desire to defend the picture, which has 
always given her a frisson of terror, disgust, and then pleasure of 
some kind. She looks at it, the faun bound to the tree, his pelt at his 
feet, his lips drawn back from his pointed teeth, his whole body 
glistening dark red with the gouts of blood that are about to burst 
forth into fountains. His anatomy is lovingly accurate; his bloody 
muscles fold over his shoulder-blades and belly. 
"It is about art. And pain--" 
"I know that," says Raphael, as though her simplicity is 
contemptible. "But it is wrong. It is bad….something in ourselves we 
should recognize and turn away from."8
 
There appears to be, for lack of a better term, a primitive pleasure, albeit one all 
but the most hedonistic moralities caution against indulging, in grabbing bare 
handed and sinking one's teeth into a juicy charbroiled T-bone or a succulent, 
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zesty drumstick. There is that familiar look of ecstasy on the face of someone 
who's just been wrapped up in a brand new luxurious pelt. And of course, one 
cannot ignore the sexual jubilation of those with a proclivity for the sleekness of 
skin tight, black leather bras, chaps, etc.. It is not, one might argue, merely the 
look or touch or feel or taste or smell of these items which produces the effect. 
These properties can be more or less reproduced with current technology. 
Arguably, the very knowledge of what they are contributes an essential element 
to the entire experience.  
Mill famously wrote in On Liberty, "No one can be a great thinker who 
does not recognize, that as a thinker, it is his first duty to follow his intellect to 
whatever conclusions it may lead."9 I suspect deontological vegetarians who 
condone faux meat and utilitarian vegetarians who condone vintage and 
secondhand leather have failed in this duty. My daughter would likely respond by 
noting she has no aspiration to be a great thinker. But the possibility should 
nevertheless be considered by vegetarians who put up such defenses they are 
post hoc attempts to justify acting on the same desire nonvegetarians putatively 
act on to consume, in one way or another, animal flesh.10 
To sum up, I have argued based on the sort of deontological reasoning 
relied on by animal rights theorists, the production, sale and consumption of all 
faux meat products, all fake animal skin products and all secondhand animal skin 
products are as immoral as the production, sale and consumption of animals for 
their skin and flesh.  I have also argued, based on the sort of vegetarianism 
recommended by Singer's utilitarian argument, that granting the production, sale 
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and consumption of faux meat does not lead to more conversions to or back to 
real meat than to the faux variety, there is no moral problem with faux meat 
products. However, I have argued when it comes to fake leather and fur, the 
utilitarian vegetarian should have the same position he or she has on faux meat 
but should reject the practice of purchasing or wearing vintage or secondhand 
leather and fur on some of the same grounds he or she objects to the wearing or 
use of new leather or other animal skin goods.       
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is strict vegetarians in particular would want to maintain rational control of any 
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